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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the effect of transitions to peace in Nicaragua, El Salvador 
and Guatemala on internal security forces.  It reveals how the influence of the military 
affected the implementation of internal security reforms, shaping the professionalism and 
effectiveness of police forces in the fight against violence and gangs today.  The research 
shows that Sandinista influence allowed Nicaragua to maintain an experienced core of 
security personnel that has confronted the present challenges more effectively.  Reforms 
in El Salvador yielded a new, highly restructured and reduced security force of which 
only one-fifth possessed some policing experience, reducing the short-term effectiveness 
of the force in the fight against insecurity, but increasing the probability for long-term 
consolidation of a professional and effective police institution.  In Guatemala, the 
transitions resulted in the creation of a new police force mostly manned by former 
security personnel, perpetuating the corruption that permeated the force prior to the 
transitions--a fact reflected in the high levels of crime in the country today.  The thesis 
proposes that the effect of the transitions on the current forces is a pivotal factor on their 
effectiveness, and must be addressed in order to improve security for citizens and 
democracy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. TRANSITIONS TO PEACE AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES:  A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NICARAGUA, EL SALVADOR AND 
GUATEMALA 
The high level of violence in Central America continues to pose a major problem 
for these new Latin American democracies.  The situation has changed from that of the 
1980s:  “no longer are civil wars the predominant threat to the state; it is now crime and 
the resulting civil insecurity that endangers the nascent democratic government.”1  In 
response to increased public attention on the problem of maras (youth gangs) and the 
media’s often sensationalist exposure of their heinous crimes, some governments have 
reacted by enacting tough anti-gang policies known as mano dura (tough hand).  These 
policies have had little success in abating the violence or increasing security for citizens.2  
In fact, “since governments began to implement these mano dura strategies, homicide 
rates have risen in Central America, and citizen security has not improved.”3  The 
problem is such that the U.S. Southern Command has “identified Central American gangs 
as one of the main threats to regional security.”4  
The violence and maras problem in Central America is a complex and 
multifaceted issue with various socio-economic roots.  The problem is augmented by 
insufficient mobilization of state resources and inadequate taxation institutions that are 
unable to generate sufficient revenue to pay for increased police forces that are better 
trained and equipped.  Government and citizen responses to rising insecurities have been 
problematic, may have undermined democratic principles, and have demonstrated how 
                                                 
1 Orlando J. Perez, “Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El 
Salvador and Guatemala,” Political Science Quarterly 118, no.4 (2003-04): 627. 
2 Clare Ribando Seelke, CRS Report for Congress:  Gangs in Central America (Washington, DC:  
Congressional Research Service, October 17, 2008), 6-9. 
3 “CQ Congressional Testimony:  Violence in Central America,” Congressional Quarterly (June 26, 
2007): 6.  The quote is from the testimony of Geoff Thale, Program Director of the Washington Office on 
Latin America. 
4 David Adams, “Threat of Central American Gangs is Growing,” St. Petersburg Times, April 17, 
2006, sec. A. 
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“states with a strong military and dictatorial past have inherent difficulties in separating 
internal security tasks from national defense functions.”5  The complexity of the issue 
calls for extensive studies in order to implement proper responses in the areas of 
prevention, suppression, and reintegration of reformed gang members into civil society.  
An area that needs more emphasis for research is the role of the military in the transitions 
to peace in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala and how it shaped the current internal 
security forces in these countries, resulting in different approaches and levels of success 
in the fight against violence and gangs.  The issue is paramount because the successful 
implementation of anti-crime policies requires an effective and professional police force.  
An analysis of the effects of the transition can help identify critical elements for reform 
that will improve the professionalism and effectiveness of these police forces, increasing 
the opportunity for success in the fight against crime.   
The case studies of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala provide an excellent 
opportunity for research on this issue, because all three countries underwent transitions 
from authoritarian governments and violent internal conflicts in which the military was 
responsible for internal security, to democratic governance with civilian police forces 
guaranteeing citizen security in the 1990s.   The transitions had an immediate effect on 
crime rates.  As Charles T. Call has pointed out, “contrary to what one might expect, 
judicial and police reforms embedded in dramatic transitions from war to peace have 
coincided with more, rather than less, violence.”6  This has certainly been the case in 
these three countries in the period immediately following the transition.  In Nicaragua, 
the crime rate “rose precipitously in the postwar period...the number of violent crimes 
reported to the police in 1990 was 8,056; this soared to 18,037 for 1995, an increase of 
112 percent.”7  In El Salvador, violent deaths from 1994-1997 exceeded the “yearly 
                                                 
5 Mathieu Deflem and Suzanne Sutphin, “Policing Post-War Iraq: Insurgency, Civilian Police and the 
Reconstruction of Society,” Sociological Focus 39 no. 4 (November 2006): 277. 
6 Charles T. Call, Sustainable Development in Central America:  The Challenges of Violence, Injustice 
and Insecurity, Office of Regional and Sustainable Development, Latin American and the Caribbean 
(LAC), U.S. Agency for International Development, 15, http://ca2020.fiu.edu.  
7 Alejandro Bendaña, “Reflections,” in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. Cynthia J. 
Arnson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 67. 
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average of 6,000 deaths during the war itself.”8  Guatemala experienced an increase in 
violent deaths from 66.9 per 100,000 in 1996 to 75.2 in 1997 and 76.9 in 1998, the two 
years following the peace accords.9   
One reason for the increase in violence is that reform often involves the removal 
of trained personnel and the “disruption of legal systems, internal security forces and 
other state enforcement mechanisms which, while meriting serious reforms, deterred 
criminal behavior.”10  Robert Perito, a former U.S. Department of State official attributes 
much of the cause for post-transition violence to the fact that “police reform will always 
be difficult, because even when police officials are given new equipment and better 
training, they will have great difficulties performing in an effective and accountable 
manner.”11  Perito calculates that the training required for an effective and professional 
police force “can take at least five years and requires the help of international experts 
with foreign experience.”12  But what explains the inability to reduce violence and gang 
presence more that a decade after the peace accords?  One possible explanation, and the 
emphasis of this thesis, is that the role played by the military before, during, and after the 
transition shaped the forces responsible for security, directly affecting their level of 
professionalism and effectiveness today.   
The military role in these Central American transitions is important because 
“prior to and during the civil conflicts that engulfed Central America in the 1970s and 
1980s, responsibility for maintenance of public order and internal security was usually 
                                                 
8 Jenny Pearce, “From Civil War to ‘Civil Society:’  Has the End of the Cold War Brought Peace to 
Central America?” International Affairs 74, no. 3 (July 1998): 590.  The author gives figures for 1994-
1995, figures for 1996-1997 are from Charles T. Call, Sustainable Development in Central America, 9. 
9 Charles T. Call, Sustainable Development in Central America, 9. 
10 Ibid., 12-13. 
11 Mathieu Deflem and Suzanne Sutphin, “Policing Post-War Iraq,” Sociological Focus 39, no. 4 
(November 2006): 277.  See also:  United States Institute of Peace Special Report:  The Coalition 
Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq, (April 2005), 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr137.html. 
12 Ibid., 277.  See also:  Robert Perito, interview, News Hour with Jim Lehrer, (April 21, 2003), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june03/recon_4-21.html. 
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part of the role and mission of the armed forces.”13  Thus, prior to the transitions, the 
militaries in these countries served as police forces with varying levels of success.  The 
transition itself plays an important role in determining if characteristics of the old force 
are eliminated or preserved.  Cynthia J. Arnson has pointed out how “the strength—moral 
and otherwise—of the armed forces going into a negotiation affects the degree to which 
they are able to protect their interests during the negotiation and behave as an 
‘authoritarian enclave’ in the post-settlement period.”14  Charles T. Call argues that 
reforms following negotiations reflect a balance between interests and bargaining 
positions of the negotiating parties.15  Therefore, the ability of the military to influence 
the transition can determine the effective implementation of different elements of the 
peace accords, the degree to which old institutions and methods are preserved, and the 
ability to create new and effective institutions and approaches to tackle internal security 
challenges in a democratic system.   
The next section will show that much of the debate on how to deal with high 
levels of crime centers on the socio-economic causes for the violence and presence of 
gangs, the appropriateness and effectiveness of government and citizen responses, the 
need for greater regional cooperation, and increased allocation of government resources 
and international assistance.  Unfortunately, this debate overlooks the transitions to peace 
and how the implementation of reforms shaped the present security forces, affecting their 
professionalism and effectiveness, and generating long-term effects on internal security 
in these post-conflict democracies.  This is an essential aspect, because the successful 
implementation of internal security policies is highly dependent on the effectiveness and 
professionalism of the security forces carrying out government strategies.  Additionally, 
by looking at how the transitions shaped the current forces, crucial areas for reform may 
 
                                                 
13 George R. Vickers, “Renegotiating Internal Security: The Lessons of Central America,” in 
Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999), 390. 
14 Cynthia J. Arnson, “Conclusion: Lessons Learned in Comparative Perspective,” in Comparative 
Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 452. 
15 Charles T. Call, “From Soldiers to Cops: War Transitions and the Demilitarization of Policing in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.”  Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1999. 
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be identified that may greatly increase effectiveness and professionalism.  Furthermore, 
inherent strengths in the more successful cases may be noted, providing a framework for 
success that may be implemented by the less successful security forces.  
B. THE CHALLENGE OF INSECURITY:  A THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 
1. Public Support of Authoritarian Measures 
The problem of violence in Central America is important because frustration with 
rising violence and the government’s failure to enforce the law undermines the 
government’s legitimacy as it “shakes public confidence in the police and judicial 
system, weakens the rule of law, and increasingly undermines support for democracy..as 
citizens may be receptive to new political alternatives, even those that would undermine 
democracy.”16 Previous public opinion polls in Central America indicate support for 
actions that threaten democratic principles.  In a survey in El Salvador, for example, 
“fifty-five percent of respondents would support a military coup under conditions of high 
crime...[and] thirty–one percent of Salvadorians expressed high support for a government 
that applies authoritarian measures.”17  Another survey showed “70.5 percent of 
Guatemalans supported a role for the armed forces in fighting crime.”18  These attitudes 
pose a significant challenge to democracy today:  as the 2008 Latinobarometro report 
shows, Latin American citizens rank crime ahead of unemployment and the economy as 
the number one problem in the region.19  
The public also appears to support more repressive measures that violate 
individual rights.  Despite reports of extrajudicial killings, it is not uncommon for citizens 
to ignore these violations of due process and concentrate on the perceived near-term 
benefits.  In Guatemala, when asked about the problem of extrajudicial killings, residents 
                                                 
16 Orlando J. Perez, “Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity,” 628-629. 
17 Orlando J. Perez, “Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity,” 638-639.  See also:  Miguel Cruz, 
“The Impact of Crime on Democratization in El Salvador” (paper delivered at the Latin American Studies 
Association 22nd International Conference, Miami, March 16-18, 2000). 
18 Ibid., 634. 
19 Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe 2008, (Santiago: Corporación Latinobarómetro, November 
2008), 23. 
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of a neighborhood known to have substantial crime problems did not show concern with 
the lack of due process and instead commented that “some of the killings had brought 
relief.”20  These attitudes demonstrate that “if governments are unable to protect citizens 
from violence in society, then unconsolidated democratic practices may be threatened by 
calls for a reversion to authoritarianism.”21  Such inclinations present a clear danger to 
democracy:  just as increased violence perpetrated by the Shining Path in Peru allowed 
Alberto Fujimori to win the presidency and consolidate his power, the pervasive violence 
in Central America provides fertile ground for new authoritarian figures to rise to power 
in the region. 
2. Alternative Justice 
Government ineffectiveness in implementing the rule of law “provides incentives 
for citizens and groups to seek alternative, informal, or private means of justice and 
security.”22  One alternative, for those who can afford it, is employing private security to 
protect them from the violence.  In Guatemala, where “the police comprise just 20,000 
officers for a country of 13 million people...unregulated private security firms employ 
perhaps 100,000 people.”23  In some cases, these private security agencies “have become 
an important repository for unemployed ex-military (and ex-guerrilla) personnel who 
might otherwise turn to common crime to make a living.”24  However, there is a negative 
aspect to the increase in these agencies as “private security efforts become an excuse not 
to invest in public security forces and violence prevention, [leaving the poor] 
unprotected, deepening unequal access to security and fueling further privatization of 
security.”25 
                                                 
20 Ginger Thompson, “Guatemala Bleeds in Vise of Gangs and Vengeance,” New York Times, January 
1, 2006, sec. 1. 
21 Charles T. Call, Sustainable Development in Central America, 7.  
22 Ibid. 
23 “Impunity rules:  Guatemala,” The Economist, November 18, 2006. 
24 Charles T. Call, Sustainable Development in Central America, 30.  According to the author, 
interviews in El Salvador indicated more than half of the personnel employed by these agencies are ex-
military. 
25 Ibid., 30. 
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As security becomes less accessible to the poor, those who cannot afford private 
security may resort to “reluctant membership in gangs or participation in crude protection 
rackets.”26  Some citizens turn to vigilantism.  A 1998 UN report noted that “vigilante 
groups in Guatemala commit crimes throughout the country with what appears to be 
complete immunity...[and] the Guatemalan justice system is either deficient or unwilling 
to prosecute cases involving vigilante groups.”27  As the Guatemalan neighborhood of El 
Mezquital illustrates, the problem continues today.  Interviewed for an article in the New 
York Times, Guadalupe del Carmen Alvarado, a resident of this neighborhood, said that 
“after gang members had killed a couple of merchants and bus drivers who had refused to 
pay war taxes, the other merchants and bus drivers pooled their money to hire gunmen to 
‘eliminate the gangs.’”28  Their action shows how the “failure to reduce crime leads both 
to vigilante actions by outraged citizens and to calls for a return of repressive 
measures.”29  Not surprisingly, in March 2006, the U.S. Department of State pointed to 
“extrajudicial killings by police, vigilantes, or former members of security forces as the 
leading human rights violation in both Honduras and Guatemala.”30  El Salvador is not 




                                                 
26 Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America (University 
Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 7. 




28 Ginger Thompson, “Guatemala Bleeds in the Vise of Gangs and Vengeance,” New York Times, 
January 1, 2006, sec. 1.  
29 George R. Vickers, “Renegotiating Internal Security: The Lessons of Central America,” in 
Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999), 410.   
30 Indira A. R. Lakshmanan, “Death Squads Said to Target youths:  Slayings of Young Men Go 
Unsolved in Central America,” Boston Globe, April 19, 2006, A6. 
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(La Sombra Negra)...however, its existence has not been officially confirmed,”31 and  “a 
2007 State Department paper on youth gangs in El Salvador states that there have been 
‘no credible reports of police engaging in extrajudicial killings of gang members.’”32   
3. Increased Criminal Organization and Efficiency 
Mano dura policies have also affected the maras.  While enforcing anti-gang 
legislation, the police have increased the number of arrests of suspected gang members, 
frightening them.33  Detractors of mano dura argue that “instead of focusing on law 
enforcement efforts aimed at capturing top gang leaders, [these] initiatives...have 
emphasized rounding up any tattooed youth, many of whom were later released for lack 
of evidence.”34  Salvadoran PNC data indicates 10,000 of 14,000 such arrestees in 2005 
were later released.35  These arrests have “overloaded the judicial system...and created a 
revolving door.”36   
The number of youths exposed to prison is alarming, because “prison-gang 
interaction is key to solidifying gang culture, recruiting new members, [and] establishing 
a base of operations for indoctrination and communications.”37  Not surprisingly, the 
maras have gotten “more organized and more clandestine...and jailed gang members have 
begun to develop prison gang networks that extend across cliques and across cities.”38  In 
                                                 
31 Ana Gilmore, “Gang Warfare: Mara Activity Becomes International Threat,” Jane’s Intelligence 




32 Clare Ribaldo Seelke, Gangs in Central America, 9.  See also:  U.S. Department of State, Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Issue Paper:  Youth Gang Organizations in El Salvador (June, 
2007).   
33 The Economist, “Out of the underworld—Criminal gangs in the Americas,” January 7, 2006. 
34 Clare Ribaldo Seelke, Gangs in Central America, 6. 
35 EFE News Service, “Most of 14,000 Gang Members Arrested in El Salvador Were Released,” 
December 27, 2005. 
36 Indira A. R. Lakshmanan, “Gangs Roil Central America; Troubles Linked to US Deportees,” Boston 
Globe, April 17, 2006, A1. 
37 John P. Sullivan, “Maras Morphing: Revisiting Third Generation Gangs,” Global Crime 7, no. 3-4 
(August-November 2006): 497. 
38 Congressional Quarterly, “CQ Congressional Testimony:  Violence in Central America,” 6. 
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essence, the maras are using jail time as an opportunity to improve their organization, 
increase their contacts and expand their ability to continue their nefarious activities.   
These prison networks and their improved organization are effective enough to allow for 
coordinated attacks:  in August 2005, “at least 35 Mara 18 members were killed by 
Salvatruchas in a coordinated effort across several Guatemalan jails.”39   
U.S. law-enforcement officials fear increased gang coordination and organization 
may reach as far as the United States.  Gang members turned informants have stated that 
in the U.S., MS-13 “gang leaders sent money to MS-13 leaders in El Salvador,”40 and 
U.S. “clique leaders were required from time to time to call gang leaders in El Salvador 
to report on how the gang was doing, and the Salvadorans would advise the local 
leaders.”41  A Congressional Research Service report for Congress on gangs in Central 
America highlights that some experts believe “contact between gang members across the 
regions is increasing, and that this tendency may have caused increased gang-related 
violent crime in the United States.”42  There are increasing fears that the gangs may be 
establishing links with organized crime,43 and “regional and U.S. authorities have 
confirmed gang involvement in regional drug trafficking.”44  
Reacting to police pressure, the maras have “changed many ‘rules’ required for 
mareros, including the need to display tattoos or dress in a particular way, allowing these 
new types of mareros to ‘blend’ into society.”45  As the gangs become less conspicuous, 
they are “able to move around easily and engage in increasingly sophisticated crimes, 
                                                 
39 The Economist, “Out of the underworld—Criminal gangs in the Americas,” January 7, 2006. 
40 Ruben Castañeda, “Ex-Member of MS-13 Wore a Wire For Agents; Testimony Could Prove Global 
Ties,” Washington Post, October 13, 2006, B01. 
41 Ruben Castañeda, “Gang Members Describe Life Inside MS-13,” Washington Post, October 18, 
2006, B06. 
42 Clare Ribaldo Seelke, Gangs in Central America, 1. 
43 Indira A. R. Lakshmanan, “Gangs Roil Central America; Troubles Linked To US Deportees,” 
Boston Globe, April 17, 2006, A1. 
44 Clare Ribaldo Seelke, Gangs in Central America, 4. 
45 Joanna Mateo, Gang Violence in Central America: The Case of Honduras; Identifying a Role for 
USSOUTHCOM (Miami: Florida International University, April 2008), 9. 
 10
blurring the distinction between gangs and organized crime networks.”46  Country reports 
at the most recent anti-gang convention (IV Convención Antipandillas) in El Salvador, 
revealed maras are increasingly involved in “more complex and lucrative crimes 
requiring greater coordination, planning and execution.”47  These patterns indicate the 
maras may be transitioning “from traditional turf gangs, to market oriented drug 
gangs,”48 what John P. Sullivan calls “2nd Generation Gangs.”  The challenge is to stop 
this evolutionary process before the maras morph into “a new third generation that 
combines political and mercenary aims.”49 
C. WHY MANO DURA HAS NOT WORKED 
1. Ignoring Other Sources of Violence 
One reason the mano dura policies have been unsuccessful is that the 
government, citizens and the media have concentrated on the maras while paying less 
attention—and even ignoring--other sources of violence.  Illegally armed groups such as 
paramilitaries and vigilantes add to the level of violence and Central America remains a 
major route for drugs entering the United States.  It has been estimated that “somewhere 
between 60 and 90 percent of the South American cocaine that enters the United States 
now comes through Central America...pulling rising levels of political instability, 





                                                 
46 Lainie Reisman, “Breaking the vicious Cycle: Responding to Central American Youth Gang 
Violence,” SAIS Review XXVI, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2006): 149. 
47 Policia Nacional de El Salvador, Recomendaciones de la IV Convencion Antipandillas (paper 
presented at the IV Anti-gang Convention, El Salvador, April 2008), 3. 
48 John P. Sullivan, “Maras Morphing: Revisiting Third Generation Gangs,” 489. 
49 John P. Sullivan, “Maras Morphing: Revisiting Third Generation Gangs,” 489. 
50 Marc Lacey, “Drug Gangs Use Violence to Sway Guatemala Vote,” New York Times, August 4, 
2007, sec. A. 
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of organized crime in the region.  Many experts agree that “organized crime and drug 
trafficking are perhaps a bigger threat to democracy in Central America because they are 
intimately linked to the corruption of state officials, undermining already fragile states.”51 
2. Ignoring Lessons Learned 
Critics argue that government focus on mano dura policies overlooks lessons 
learned from places like Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama that have been successful in 
controlling the youth gang problem.  Nicaragua has gangs and drug dealing issues, “but 
cliques of MS-13 and the 18th Street Gang are not present, and Nicaraguan gangs are less 
violent and engaged in less criminal activity than gangs in neighboring countries.”52  The 
same pattern is present in Costa Rica and Panama.  In all three countries, where “gang 
membership and violence are dramatically lower, authorities have focused on crime-
prevention programs within families, schools, and communities.”53 
3. Lack of Government Resources and Coordination 
Another problem is that governments have failed to dedicate resources and efforts 
to deal with the socio-economic conditions that are the root causes driving young people 
to join the maras and engage in violent crime.  In Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, 
“social service budgets are too small to offer attractive alternatives to idle youth.”54  
Meanwhile, family violence and common street crime remain major factors in exposing 
youths to violence.  Ivan Estuardo Garcia, of the United Nations Development Project in 
Guatemala, argues that “the lack of employment opportunities, educational facilities and 
recreational spaces is putting 2 million more youths at risk of joining gangs.”55  As 
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unemployment and underemployment permeate the lower strata of society, they 
perpetuate severe income inequality in the region.  This presents a major danger as 
“scholars have identified income inequality as the strongest predictor of violent crime 
rates.  Central America, along with Southern Africa and South America, is one of the 
most unequal regions in the world.”56   
Lack of coordination between agencies and programs combines with insufficient 
resources to frustrate attempts to deal with socio-economic causes of violence.  This has 
resulted in Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other activists often running 
programs with little or no cooperation from the local governments.  Even worse, in places 
like Guatemala, “there are threats and attacks on human rights activists and defenders 
and, in many countries, electoral contests generate politically motivated violence.”57  A 
vivid illustration of the need for greater coordination and accountability is the blame 
game that occurred in El Salvador in 2006:  “the police blamed the judicial system for 
failing to successfully prosecute those arrested; the judiciary decried the overcrowding of 
the prisons; the leftist FMLN opposition party blamed ARENA [the ruling party], and so 
on.”58 
The government’s failure to allocate sufficient resources stems from the inability 
to raise sufficient tax revenue.  In Guatemala, the government collects taxes 
approximating “10 percent of gross domestic product, one of the lowest in Latin 
America, and while collection is improving, passing far-reaching fiscal reform has so far 
proved impossible.”59 Guatemala’s situation reflects “the reticence of certain factions 
within the organized private sector to increase direct taxes and the lack of consensus 
among the major political parties on other taxation issues.”60  Some progress has been 
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made to increase revenue and mobilize government resources:  “a purge [in 2006] of the 
customs service, now run by better-trained staff is part of the reason.”61  In El Salvador, 
President Saca “agreed to increase the size and pay of the police force...strengthen its 
recently revamped witness protection programme and to expand the capacity of its 
dangerously overcrowded system.”62  Nevertheless, the collection of tax revenue remains 
a factor:  “to pay for much of [these initiatives], the government is seeking permission 
from Congress to borrow U.S. $100 million from the World Bank.  Presently, raising 
taxes is not under consideration, say government officials.”63  The situation underlines 
the fact that traditional elites are unlikely to lend support to tax increases.   
4. Insufficient Foreign Assistance 
Foreign assistance is unlikely to make up for lack of state resources.  In El 
Salvador, for example, implementation of high-priority items stemming from the peace 
accords was estimated to cost a total of $1.1 billion.64  At the start of 1994, “the 
government of El Salvador and the international donors each had committed about $300 
million to high-priority peace programs, leaving a $500 million funding gap.”65  The gaps 
indicate that although foreign aid may serve as “an important complement to limited 
domestic resources...it can, however, also become a substitute for them,”66 resulting in 
“lack of pressure on the national government to increase its mobilization of domestic 
resources.”67 
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Insufficient or unbalanced funding continues to be a problem.  The most recent 
aid package put forth by the U.S., Iniciativa Merida, “seeks to modernize law 
enforcement with a variety of high tech equipment for fingerprint databases and Internet-
based investigation networks.”68  However, the money distribution, approved in June 
2008 provides a lot more aid to Mexico than to all of Central America:  400 million 
versus 65 million, respectively.69  Reactions from Central American presidents range 
from disappointment by El Salvador’s Tony Saca, who felt that the Central American 
countries were getting “very little cash,” to outright concern by Guatemala’s Eduardo 
Stein, the outgoing Vice-president who argued that “you squeeze Mexico and everything 
will move to Central America, which lacks the capacity to deal with an increase in 
organized crime.”70  
5. Leaning on the Military 
The lack of national and international resources has made it difficult to increase 
the size and training of the civilian police force at the same time that concerned citizens 
clamor for the government to attenuate crime.  “Reinforcing police with troops is often an 
attractive option for governments faced with internal security challenges”71 such as those 
faced by Central American nations today. As David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas 
have pointed out, “in Latin America, civilians give the military domestic roles to 
compensate for state weakness and the deterioration of regime legitimacy.”72  “Since the 
police everywhere are overwhelmed by the maras, governments have no option but to put 
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the troops back into the streets.”73  Not surprisingly, faced with insufficient numbers of 
effectively trained police, corruption, lack of funds to increase the size and quality of the 
civilian police forces, and public frustration with rising violence, some Central American 
governments have integrated the military in the implementation of the rule of law.  
The decision to employ the military as a supplement to the undermanned and 
insufficiently-equipped police forces contradicts civil-military theorists who warn that 
“military internal roles are detrimental to democracy...[because] domestic roles bolster 
the military politically and eventually lead to the overthrow of democratic 
governments.”74  The potential for military intervention is magnified by the lack of 
resources appropriated to the national police forces.  As Benjamin Beede has noted, 
“making the police independent of the army, but reducing their personnel levels and 
limiting police training, equipment, and weapons may simply open the door to army 
intrusion.”75  Another concern is that “although current security problems may bring 
increased cooperation between police and military authorities, they may also bring 
increased conflict between them.”76   
Human rights advocates are concerned that the military is increasingly involved in 
police activities at the same time that mano dura legislation has “increased the arbitrary 
authority of police officers to arrest young people, in a region that has struggled to 
regulate police behavior to ensure respect for due process and human rights.”77  Even in 
places without Central America’s troubled past, “detailing soldiers to law enforcement is 
a clumsy, often ineffective expedient, partly because soldiers almost always lack 
appropriate training.  Therefore, they are inflexible in their behavior and are prone to 
overreacting in confrontations with the public.”78  In addition to human rights concerns 
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for many critics and NGOs, the use of the military for internal security undermines the 
achievements of the peace accords, and is effectively a rollback of policies implemented 
at the end of the civil wars, that sought to increase the legitimacy of the civil police by 
removing it from the circle of influence of the military “because of charges of corruption, 
extrajudicial killings, and military links to narco-trafficking.”79   
6. Failure to Reexamine the Transition Process and Its Effect on 
Security Forces 
Using the military for internal security can negatively affect resources allocated 
for the police.  Recently, Guatemala’s President Colom proposed a US$292 million 
increase in the military budget to modernize the army in an effort to improve it’s “weak 
capacity to fight organized crime.”80  This situation illustrates how, as the military 
assumes more responsibilities, its prerogatives increase, further challenging the police for 
money, personnel and equipment.  The police must react by emphasizing that the military 
role should be temporary, so more effort and resources must be spent on strengthening 
the police forces.  
The problem of violence in these countries requires the proper application of 
prevention, intervention, reintegration and suppression together with the compilation of 
reliable information in order to identify the areas that warrant the most attention and the 
approaches that are best suited for each particular case.  No strategy for fighting crime 
will work, however, without professional and effective police forces.  For this reason, a 
better understanding of the transitions in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala is 
essential in order to understand how the military’s ability to affect the process of 
negotiation and implementation of reforms has defined the nature of today’s police 
forces, their professionalism and effectiveness. 
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A. THE NICARAGUAN ARMY PRIOR TO THE 1990 ELECTIONS:  A 
SIZABLE AND CAPABLE INSTRUMENT OF REPRESSION 
Under the Sandinista regime, the Nicaraguan Armed Forces assumed both 
external and internal security roles.  The concept of external and internal security derived 
from the “72-Hour Document,” composed by the Sandinista leadership following their 
July 19, 1979 defeat of Anastacio Somoza.  This document assumed an “inevitable 
confrontation with the United States, which would necessitate the consolidation of 
Sandinista domestic power with the backing of a large and heavily-armed Sandinista 
People’s Army (EPS).”81  Externally, the army concentrated on the problem of the 
contra-revolutionary forces (contras) opposing the Sandinista government and the ever-
looming specter of an invasion by the United States.  Internally, the security apparatus 
sought to carry out “normal peacetime internal security functions...[and] provide some 
margin of safety against possible counterrevolutionary activity coming from within or 
beyond Nicaragua’s borders.”82  The potential external and internal threats required a 
sizable and capable force. 
External security was the responsibility of the (EPS), under the direction of the 
Ministry of Defense. To carry out this task, the EPS force grew from nearly 5,000 in July 
1979 to 250,000 by 1989 (counting active duty, people’s militia, and reserves).83  The 
large numbers were supported by a draft instituted in 1983 that brought “more than 
150,000 youths...for two-year tours of duty”84 into the army.  Leaving out the militias, “at 
its peak strength in 1986, the EPS counted over 120,000 soldiers, some 75,000 of whom 
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were enlistees or draftees on active duty.”85  Much of the core element of the force was 
well trained, with some members receiving training in the Soviet Union and Cuba.  
Additionally, these and other countries provided foreign advisors to enhance training 
within Nicaragua.  At one point, Nicaragua hosted “between 2,500 and 3,000 Cuban and 
other Soviet-bloc security personnel, and an equal number of civilian advisers...[that] 
helped set up a highly efficient intelligence and police apparatus.”86  One example of 
foreign training assistance is the development of the elite Pablo Ubeda Troops (TPU), 
consisting of nearly five hundred troops “trained in commando and antiterrorist 
operations by Vietnamese instructors.”87  Strategically, the Sandinistas’ concern with a 
possible invasion from the United States led them to keep  “the regular army in or around 
the major urban areas to serve as a deterrent to invasion while, in effect, leaving local 
militia to deal with the contras.”88  This resulted in a localized, community approach to 
security.  In addition to countering the counterrevolutionary threat, government control in 
the cities left little social space for criminal organizations to emerge.   
The task of providing internal security fell to the Ministry of Interior (MINT), led 
by Tomás Borge, and composed of the police (numbering less than 10,000 by the time of 
the 1990 elections),89 and State Security forces (numbering 4,000 members by the mid-
1980s).90  State Security “maintained surveillance of potentially subversive groups and 
broke them up when they began to embark on subversive activities.”91  Additionally, 
MINT shared control of the Sandinista People’s Militias (MPS) with the Ministry of 
Defense.92 Militia membership has been estimated to run “from between a few tens of 
                                                 
85 David Close, Nicaragua: The Chamorro Years (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 102. 
86 Linda Robinson, Intervention of Neglect: The United States and Central America Beyond the 1980s 
(New York: Council On Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 15. 
87 Roger Miranda and William Ratliff, The Civil War In Nicaragua, 26. 
88 Thomas W. Walker, “The Armed Forces,” 88. 
89 La Prensa, “Contras, Nuevos Policias: 150 Desalzados a Imponer la Ley,” June 28, 1990, 1. 
90 Roger Miranda and William Ratliff, The Civil War In Nicaragua, 190. 
91 Thomas W. Walker, “The Armed Forces,” 84. 
92 Ibid., 81. 
 19
thousands to at least 100,000”93 at different times.  Like the army, MINT received 
foreign organizational and training assistance:  Borge’s ministry, “closely coached by its 
Cuban counterpart and unfettered by the niceties of a democratic judicial system, worked 
relentlessly to prevent a contra foothold in the cities.”94 MINT was largely successful in 
this mission, owing to the fact that it “grew enormously larger and more pervasive under 
the Sandinistas than its counterpart had been under Somoza.”95   
In addition to army and MINT forces, the Sandinistas counted on “a vast network 
of informers.”96  This network consisted of “vertically structured mass organizations of 
workers, youth, women, and others; the Sandinista Defense Committees [CDS], directly 
modeled on the Cuban Committees for the Defense of the Revolution; as well as informal 
groups.”97  Among the many functions of these mass organizations was vigilance.98  
Principal amongst them, the CDS served as “a sort of neighborhood crime watch that 
spectacularly reduced the incidence of common violence and petty crime.”99  The CDS 
also served to bring the presence of the state to more isolated areas by substituting “for 
local government in many cases, dispensing ration cards as food became scarce or 
relaying information about government policies.”100   
The Sandinista Police (PS) was developed in late 1979 as a supplement to internal 
security forces.  Prior to the Sandinistas taking power, “the National Guard had 
performed police services,”101 so the new force had to be developed from scratch.  Initial 
training assistance from Panama and Cuba helped to develop the force with hundreds 
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receiving training at the Panamanian police academy.102 Later training consisted of an 
eight-month course that “included a heavy dose of military training because in a national 
emergency the PS was expected to perform a support role in national defense.103  
Although the force was small, it was supplemented with “Revolutionary Vigilance 
Patrols organized by neighborhood Sandinista Defense Committees.[that] conducted 
nighttime walks through neighborhoods and tended to discourage community crime.”104  
Access to Sandinista mass organizations resulted in a network of “nearly 1,600 local 
committees with more than 12,000 community volunteers working with the 1,500 police 
[that] created an early warning system,”105 increasing effectiveness against criminal 
activity. 
The sizable Sandinista army, State Security, and network of informants succeeded 
in curtailing crime, preventing the growth of internal counter-revolutionary efforts, and 
denying the contras any substantial military achievements.  As a result of this success, 
and decreased international support for the contras, the army was well positioned to 
defend its prerogatives during the transition to democratic rule following the election of 
Violeta Chamorro as president in 1990. 
B. THE NICARAGUAN ARMY IN THE TRANSITION:  NEGOTIATING 
FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH 
The relatively strong position of the army vis-à-vis the contras and Violeta 
Chamorro’s Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO) party after the elections allowed it to 
negotiate favorable terms of transition that maintained the integrity and core competence 
of existing security forces.  This strength resulted from the divided camps within UNO 
and the contras that presented a fractured opposition.  Additionally, the Sandinistas were 
quick to regroup following their electoral defeat and passed legislation to protect their 
interests prior to the transfer of power.  One such piece of legislation was the General 
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Amnesty and National Reconciliation Law providing “‘full and unconditional amnesty’ 
to those who had committed crimes ‘against the public order and the internal or external 
security of the state.’  This covered both Sandinistas and resistance fighters, and it was 
justified as a means of forestalling political reprisals.”106  Other Sandinista interests were 
protected through additional laws enacted to address civil service, labor, media, 
university and property concerns.107  The Sandinistas’ actions reflected their fear of 
reprisals for the abuses of the 1980s which generated the belief that “if they did not 
maintain their grassroots organizations and at least some control over the armed forces, 
their very lives would be at risk.”108 
The contras were much weakened by the time of the transition.  Their fractured 
organization had yielded minimal military achievements in the war against the 
Sandinistas.  The Tela accord of 1989, “in which Central American leaders agreed to 
deny territorial access to irregular forces and to set up internationally sponsored 
demobilization procedures, pulled the rug out from under contra forces that had operated 
freely in Honduras and Costa Rica.”109  The 1990 elections further weakened the contras 
by removing “all possibilities for maintaining themselves as an opposition military force 
and conducting a systematic peace negotiation.”110  Although they were “encouraged by 
the Bush administration to build a strong rhetorical alliance with [UNO],”111 they played 
a minor role in the initial transition process as the Sandinistas and UNO negotiated the 
protocol of agreement for the transfer of power.  Illustrating their internal divisions and 
their inability to act as an effective political front, “each of the major [contra] groups 
wound up negotiating a separate peace with the Chamorro government”112 after the 
transition. 
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UNO did not present a more united front.  There were divisions within those who 
wanted to punish the Sandinistas and the moderates who wanted a more conciliatory 
approach. President Chamorro understood that one of the biggest challenges for 
Nicaraguan democracy was “what to do with the still powerful Sandinistas who, after all, 
controlled the armed forces.”113  Chamorro believed the best approach was 
reconciliation.  As a result, “the Sandinistas were allowed to control the armed forces, the 
police and several government posts.”114  The moderates in the new government 
envisioned a post transition situation in which “the structures, institutions, and 
constitutional order erected while the Sandinistas had been in power would be left in 
place, including the armed forces.”115  The critical stage addressing these concerns was 
the negotiation for a transition protocol that would guide the transfer of power to the new 
government.   
The army was well represented at these negotiations as the Sandinista negotiating 
team “was led by General Humberto Ortega, the president’s brother and Nicaragua’s 
chief of defense staff...[and included] Major General Joaquín Cuadra, the military’s 
second in command.”116  The UNO negotiators were led by “Antonio Lacayo, 
Chamorro’s son-in-law...much to the dismay of the more committed anti-Sandinistas.  
His team included Carlos Hurtado and Luis Sanchez, both associated at that time with the 
alliance’s accommodationist wing.”117   
The army and the Sandinistas fared well:  “the essence of the pact, signed on 
March 27 after a month of tense negotiations, was respect for the existing constitutional 
order, including the state apparatus and armed forces which had been built up since 
1979.”118  Ortega remained in charge of the army and René Vivas, a Sandinista, retained 
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leadership of the National Police.119  UNO received three concessions:  security forces 
were depoliticized, the president “would have exclusive authority for naming the 
Ministers of Defense and Interior, thus bringing these institutions under civilian 
control...[and] the EPS would be significantly reduced in size.”120  Although the army 
would be reduced, the strong negotiating position of the Sandinistas allowed for a 
preservation of the more capable members of the institution as well as other parts of the 
security apparatus. 
C. AFTER THE TRANSITION:  AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY APPARATUS 
PRESERVED 
The Sandinistas’ legislative moves and transition protocol negotiations prior to 
the transfer of power allowed them to preserve the integrity and core capabilities of the 
effective security apparatus they had created.  A Sandinista decree enacted prior to 
Chamorro’s inauguration diminished the authority of the Defense Minister by handing 
powers from the defense minister to the army’s chief of staff.  As a result of this decree,  
“even though Chamorro announced the military would be cut in half by the end of 1990, 
Humberto Ortega would be in charge of selecting those to be dismissed.”121    
Illustrating Ortega’s influence, “on June 11, 1990...Ortega delivered to President 
Chamorro a new plan for EPS [army] troop reductions.”122  Chamorro directed the 
appropriate troop levels, but the Sandinistas controlled the details of implementation.  
This allowed them to conform to troop reductions in a manner that maintained the more 
capable core in place while the majority of reductions would initially come from draftees 
and the reserves.  As a result “even with the reductions...the army [remained] a Sandinista 
stronghold”123 in 1991.  Ortega continued to exert his influence until 1995, when he 
stepped down as head of the armed forces.   
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The remaining security apparatus was transferred or modified to maintain 
capabilities.  In addition to retaining control of the police under Vivas, the Sandinistas 
moved to preserve the capabilities of the Interior Ministry (MINT).  This was 
accomplished by transferring State Security forces to the army.124  The General 
Directorate for State Security (DGSE) “along with 1,200 of its 1,700 members, was 
transferred to the army and renamed the Directorate of Defense Information 
(DID)...believed to conduct both military intelligence and internal intelligence 
gathering.”125  Additionally, “Borge’s feared secret police was absorbed into the 
military’s intelligence unit.”126  This was a coup for Ortega who had often competed with 
Borge for influence.  Furthermore, the Sandinistas preserved their mass organizations, 
ensuring that security forces retained access to a vast network of informers.   
The Sandinista Police was renamed the National Police and efforts were made to 
demilitarize and depoliticize the institution.  The uniform was changed “to regulation 
blue from a more militaristic beige and olive green...and 450 demobilized contra fighters 
were integrated in stages.  Hundreds of Sandinistas who could not work side by side with 
past foes left voluntarily,”127 but the majority of the former force remained in place.  
Additionally, the police benefited from an increase in personnel, improved training, more 
stringent admissions requirements for the police academy, and a revised curriculum of 
instruction developed by a civilian-led task force.  
Today, human rights training is part of the initial curriculum for cadets and the 
police academy offers several programs tailored for different specialties.  Cadets must 
have completed a minimum of three years of high school and undergo a selection 
process.  The basic course lasts one year and trains cadets to carry out tasks as regular 
police, traffic police and detainee control officers.  Upon completion of the course, cadets 
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also receive the equivalent of a high school technical degree, thus increasing their 
academic level.  Additionally, the academy offers a four-year degree in Police Science 
for officers, sector chiefs and municipal chiefs.  A two-year master’s degree in Police 
Management as well as 6-month postgraduate certificates in police administration, 
quality control and criminal investigation completes the academic offerings.128 
In addition to an increase in force strength, retaining experienced personnel, 
improved training, and a higher quality of recruits the police retained access to the 
previous Sandinista mass organization and community networks producing a high level 
of “confidence and contact between the local communities and police.”129  A recent study 
by Demoscopia credits the Nicaraguan police for implementing successful prevention 
programs for at-risk youth, coordinating their efforts with civil society and community 
organizations, and including ex-gang members in prevention efforts.130  This is an 
important factor in the Nicaraguan police’s effectiveness against gangs, since the 
Demoscopia study concludes that community centered measures provide the best results 
in preventing youths from embarking in criminal activities or joining gangs.131  
Highlighting the professionalism and community relations effort of the police, a survey 
concluded in December 2005 revealed that 64% of the public saw the police as “usually 
professional,” 17 percent as “very professional,” and only 15 percent saw them as “not 
professional.”132 
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III. EL SALVADOR 
A. THE ARMY OF EL SALVADOR PRIOR TO THE PEACE ACCORDS:  
LOSING THE SUPPORT OF THE ELITE 
Prior to the signing of the peace accords in El Salvador, internal security was the 
responsibility of “three branches of the armed forces...the National Police and the 
Treasury Police, which operated primarily in urban areas, and the National Guard, which 
operated in rural areas.”133  A National Intelligence Directorate supported the 60,000 
strong security personnel in 1991.134  Overall, “the security forces had extremely poor 
investigative skills and lacked the most basic skills for protecting, recording, and using 
evidence.”135  Despite the large number of this force, its ineffectiveness was reflected by 
“one of the highest national homicide rates in the world—roughly five times the 
homicide rate in the average large city in the United States.”136 
Support for the army had diminished amongst the country’s elite in the 1980s.  It 
began to erode “when the armed forces carried out a major land reform in 1980, 
expropriating the largest properties in the country.”137  The army had also become a 
competitor to business elites:  “between 1980 and 1989, the army increased its size four 
times over, achieving financial development with interests of its own,”138 at times 
competing with civilian businesses.  Political and business leaders became conscious of 
the economic costs of the war.  After his election in 1989, President Cristiani, and “his 
moderate business colleagues recognized the impossibility of economic recovery without 
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a resolution of the war.”139  Their pragmatic view created the opening for negotiations 
that would culminate in the January 16, 1992 signing of the peace accords in Mexico City 
at Chapultepec. 
B. NEGOTIATIONS:  REFORMING THE ARMED FORCES 
The Salvadoran armed forces held a weak negotiating position at the end of 1989.  
Although the army had fought the FMLN to a stalemate, the army’s credibility and moral 
standing suffered a severe blow as a result of a major FMLN offensive and its aftermath.  
This offensive, launched in November 1989, “had a decisive outcome on the shape of the 
negotiated settlement.”140  As noted by the Los Angeles Times, “the offensive of the 
FMLN showed that it [was] a strong force that [could not] be defeated militarily.”141  For 
the elites, “the FMLN’s offensive had the effect of reinforcing the beliefs...that economic 
recovery and the maintenance of public support would require a negotiated end to the 
conflict necessitating compromise and concessions on both sides.”142  More importantly, 
“for the Bush administration, U.S. military advisers, and the Salvadoran army and 
government, the November offensive destroyed whatever illusions existed that the FMLN 
was fading away as a military threat.”143 
In the biggest misstep of all, members of the army’s Atlacatl rapid-reaction 
infantry battalion--acting on orders from the army’s high command--murdered “six Jesuit 
priests and two coworkers on 16 November 1989, during the FMLN’s offensive, 
[creating] the most important crisis for U.S. policy in El Salvador in a decade.”144  The 
investigation into these murders became “the subject of ongoing monitoring by a U.S. 
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Congressional task force, [and] served to maintain congressional pressure to an 
unprecedented extent.”145  At one point, the U.S. Congress “cut 50 percent of the military 
aid to El Salvador and conditioned the remainder on progress in the Jesuit murder 
investigation and the peace talks.”146  Additionally, “the Jesuit case weakened 
dramatically the position of the Salvadoran armed forces in the government’s 
negotiations with the FMLN.”  These incidents and the erosion of elite and U.S. support, 
relegated the armed forces to a defensive posture during the negotiations.  As a result, 
“the interest of the Salvadoran armed forces lay in guaranteeing its continued existence as 
an institution and it appears to have been willing (or forced) to concede much so long as 
the institution continued.”147 
The FMLN bargaining position improved as the 1989 offensive showed that, 
although the guerrillas were “unable to defeat the army in major battles, [they] could hold 
the economy hostage indefinitely through sabotage.”148  Even though the offensive had 
demonstrated to the FMLN that the people would not join a massive uprising against the 
government, they understood the economic leverage their military capabilities gave them, 
particularly with regards to the Cristiani government’s concerns to develop the country’s 
economy and solidify popular support for future elections.   
Despite their strong bargaining position, the FMLN did not present a completely 
united front, as there was disagreement during the negotiations.  One of their negotiators, 
Salvador Samayoa, “reported that debate within the FMLN and its constituent parties was 
far more difficult than negotiating with the government.”149  Additionally, the 
government followed a strategy of “conceding the minimum amount of change in 
political, military, social, and economic structures and arrangements in order to win the 
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demobilization of the FMLN and an end to the war.”150  Nevertheless, “El Salvador’s 
civilian leaders, along with the FMLN, used the peace process to reform the armed forces 
and diminish the preeminent political and internal security role it had played in the 
past.”151  This was essential in order to guarantee the safety of demobilized combatants 
and open up the necessary space for the FMLN to function as a legitimate political party.  
In order to achieve these concessions, the FMLN relegated socioeconomic demands to 
the back of the priority list as “part of what would be contested subsequently in the 
electoral arena.”152 
C. AFTERMATH:  A SECURITY FORCE IN TRANSITION 
The first obstacle the Salvadoran internal security forces faced after the peace 
accords involved personnel issues.  The army did not have control over who would be 
retained or expelled from the security forces, resulting in the removal of experienced and 
capable personnel. Further reducing the experience level, the accords stipulated that the 
new police force (PNC) would be manned as follows:  “20 percent of the new force 
members [would be] qualified former FMLN combatants, 20 percent former National 
Police and the remainder civilian.”153  As a result, 80% of the new force would have little 
to no experience, coming right out of training at the newly instituted police academy.  
The Chapultepec accords also called for a purge of personnel by “establishing 
independent commissions to identify those responsible for major human rights abuses 
and to purge the army of its most serious human rights violators.”154  The peace 
agreement “stipulated that all Salvadoran armed forces officers would be evaluated by an 
ad hoc commission composed of three prominent Salvadorans...[and] empowered the 
commission to recommend the discharge or transfer of officers reviewed.”155  The 
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commission reviewed senior officers and provided a report “which included over 100 
unpublished names, [and] was delivered in late October 1992 to U.N. Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali and President Cristiani.  The named officers were to be removed 
within sixty days.”156 
The government tried to get around the ad hoc commission’s recommendations to 
remove these officers from the force.  Rather than being removed, “according to a 
January 7, 1993, letter from Boutros-Ghali to the Security Council president, 23 officers 
had been cashiered; 25 transferred to other military posts in the country; [and] 38 placed 
on leave without pay until they retired in no more than six months.”157  Several others 
received different options:  the Vice Minister of Defense “was allowed to stay until his 
retirement on March 1; seven were sent into ‘golden exile’ as military attachés abroad; 
[and] eight, including Defense Minister Ponce, were scheduled to remain on active duty 
until May 1994.”158  Despite many delays and deal making, the ‘golden exile’ officers 
and those scheduled to serve until 1994 were retired in June 1993.159 
The armed forces were reduced from 60,000 in 1991, to 30,000 in 1992, and 
15,000 by 1999.  Today, the armed forces number 14,100.160  The National Guard, 
Treasury Police and National Police were disbanded. Most members of the Special 
Investigative Unit (DIU) and the Executive Anti-Narcotics unit (UEA) were gone from 
the force by March 1995,161 forcing the government to “start from scratch to develop new 
investigative units.”162  The reorganization of elite units is important, because “it has 
been demonstrated that elite units such as those dedicated to fighting narco-traffic and 
kidnappings have generated a high level of effectiveness as a result of the political 
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support and greater resource allocation enjoyed by these units.”163 Additionally, the 
accords dissolved the intelligence wing of the military,164 leaving the new police force 
without access to an effective information network.  Furthermore, internal security ceased 
to be one of the “constitutional responsibilities of the army; except under exceptional 
circumstances and subject to recall by the legislature.”165   
The net result of these reforms was a 75% reduction in the number of personnel 
carrying out internal security responsibilities.  A National Defense University study 
calculates that “the end of the war reduced the overall forces of vigilance from roughly 
75,000 to around 6,000.”166  This sizable reduction in forces was not accompanied by a 
proportional increase in police forces—today, the PNC in El Salvador numbers 21,000 
personnel, with 4,624 performing administrative support duties and 16,376 actual 
police.167  
Compounding the personnel problem, the quality of initial recruits was lacking.  
Former FMLN applicants “did not have the necessary educational requirements [and] in 
exchange for the government bypassing educational standards, the FMLN agreed to 
include members from the Treasury Police and the National Guard in the new police 
force.”168  The government rationalized the attempt to keep some of the former personnel 
as a way to minimize the security void created by the massive force reductions.  Facing 
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an increase in crime “the government steadily postponed or rescheduled planned 
demobilization of the old National Police on the grounds that crime was out of 
control.”169  These government attempts to circumvent the accords met with significant 
international pressure at every occasion.   
A lack of resources accentuated the experience gap in the new PNC. Training of 
the new force suffered delays from the outset.  Initially, the military refused to give up a 
suitable site for the new Academia Nacional de Seguridad Publica (ANSP), and when 
they finally complied, “it first stripped the building of anything of value that could be 
removed, increasing the costs of preparing the site.”170  The creation and implementation 
of a training curriculum for the new academy “took longer than anticipated, and the 
government initially failed to provide funds for recruitment, testing, students’ uniforms, 
food, stipends, and other operating costs.”171  Early classes were trained “without access 
to such basics as handcuffs, batons, fingerprinting sets, basic crime lab equipment, a 
photography lab, vehicles, a driving instruction track, adequate firearms, and a shooting 
range.”172  Due to these deficiencies, “some of the best training received by the new 
PNC...[took] place outside the country, particularly at an academy in Puerto Rico, where 
sixty officers received an accelerated training course as transitional commanders.”173 
Insufficient resources affected the initial deployment of PNC forces as 
“complaints about insufficient vehicles, radios, arms, and uniforms were heard in every 
police post from Chalatenango to La Unión.”174  Some of the resources were held back as 
a result of the military holding back equipment needed for police operations.175  Even 
though “the Vice-Ministry of Defense for Public Security had significant numbers of 
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trucks and portable radios...most were retained by the military.  The National Police was 
left with only a few aging police cruisers, an insufficient number of trucks, and very few 
radios.”176  These problems compromised the effectiveness of the new police force, as 
illustrated by the experience in San Vicente:  according to an officer who took part in the 
first deployment of PNC units to the area, “When we arrived there was great publicity 
and the gangs disappeared.  But when they discovered there were no vehicles or arms, 
they reappeared.”177  
Despite the challenges, delays, and training and equipment problems, “by mid-
1995 the majority of the agreements signed between the government and the FMLN had 
been carried out, although the process involved a great deal of struggle and, at times, 
required outside intervention to move the process forward.”178  The armed forces were 
significantly transformed.  Much progress has been made from the early days of PNC 
deployment.  Initially consisting of seven divisions (Public Security, Criminal 
Investigation, Borders, Finance, Arms and Explosives, Personality Protection, 
Environmental), the PNC added five new divisions in January 2000, consisting of 
Financial Crimes, Internal Affairs, Mounted Police, Scientific Police and INTERPOL.179  
Additionally, with assistance from international organizations, “the PNC has also 
generally improved its institutional capacity in recent years such as emergency response, 
investigations, strategic crime prevention planning, criminal records database 
management, and advanced police training.”180  The police also developed “a 911 
emergency response system that reportedly provides service to 65 percent of 
Salvadorans.”181   
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The police academy (ANSP) “was separated from the PNC and [reports] 
independently to government authorities rather than the PNC Director General.”182  A 
separate advisory board develops the educational curriculum and the academy continues 
to improve professional development of the force.  In 2006, the academy instituted 
distance education modules that will enable new police officers to continue their 
development at the same time that they carry out their duties.  The courses are 
administered by academy instructors and include such diverse topics as ethics, 
constitutional law, transit and highway security, criminology, institutional doctrine, crisis 
management, and special laws.183  More modules are currently in development. 
New admission standards have increased the quality of recruits.  The initial 
requirement to have completed at least 9 years of schooling has been raised to require a 
high school diploma.  The increased standards were necessary “after it became clear that 
educational deficiencies among some of the first graduates of the academy were 
interfering with their ability to learn the penal code and adopt correct procedures.”184  
Applicants must also be between 18 and 28 years old, and undergo testing and evaluation, 
including psychological evaluation, in order to qualify for the academy.   
The PNC has also institutionalized checks and balances to guarantee the quality 
and performance of the force.  Initial errors such as those noted by ONUSAL in 1994 
which reported “that almost all ‘monitors’ responsible for internal discipline were former 
National Policemen”185 have been corrected.  Today, the force counts with Inspector 
General and Internal Auditing offices to oversee performance, accountability, and 
adherence to democratic policing norms.186  Additionally, the government created a new 
Ministry of Public Security and Justice in 2006.187   
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El Salvador has emerged as a regional leader in the fight against gangs and narco-
traffic.  El Salvador and Guatemala “agreed to set up a joint security force to patrol gang 
activity along their common border.”188  An International Law Enforcement Academy 
(ILEA) has been established in Santa Tecla, and the FBI “has created a special task force 
focusing on MS-13 and opened a liaison office in San Salvador to coordinate regional 
information-sharing and anti-gang efforts.”189  With the support of U.S. Department of 
State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), the ILEA sponsors 
anti-gang workshops for law enforcement personnel from various countries in Central 
America.190  A Transnational Anti-Gang unit (TAG), created by FBI/INL recently 
became operational and is composed of Salvadoran police and U.S. FBI agents.  Given 
all the advances by the PNC, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) 
considers police reforms in El Salvador “a success story.”191 
Despite recent successes, the PNC is still working through the aftermath of the 
peace accords.  The reduction of internal security forces by nearly 75%, the erosion of 
near-term capabilities resulting from the removal of experienced personnel, and the initial 
low-quality and insufficient training of new recruits are considerable challenges to 
surmount.  As a result, the PNC today is a security force in transition, working to fill the 
security void that followed reforms.  Thanks to improved training, better recruits, and few 
remaining members of the old force, the PNC exhibits a positive trend towards greater 
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IV. GUATEMALA 
A. THE GUATEMALAN ARMY PRIOR TO TRANSITION: CORRUPTION 
AND CONTROL 
The Guatemalan military numbered 44,000 personnel in 1993,192 and exerted 
considerable influence in the country as well as the government.  The military retained 
considerable control of internal security through “special military units and an extensive 
paramilitary structure under military control.”193  The influence of the armed forces in 
internal security was accompanied by a custom of intervening in governmental affairs, 
and corrupted the institution.  Some military personnel took part in the drug trade, as 
illustrated by DEA files linking “active duty military personnel...with drugs-running 
operations,”194 and “at the height of military corruption in the 1980s, officers had already 
gained control of the country’s major narcotics rings.”195   
The pattern of corruption continued through the 1990s “when many military 
officers opposed the peace negotiations [and] army involvement was widespread in 
criminal activities such as extortion, kidnapping, auto-theft rings, drug trafficking and 
timber contraband.”196  In October 1996 “Guatemalan authorities broke up an organized 
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crime ring that included the vice minister of defense and other high-ranking military 
officers, top police officials, customs officers, and private businessmen.”197  Corruption 
and abuse resulted in international isolation, prompting calls for change.   
The military ruled Guatemala in the 1970s and the 1980s until the election of 
Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo in 1985.  The democratic opening that allowed for the 
power transition to Cerezo resulted from “the wearing down of the military governments, 
which faced the country’s growing economic problems, the erosion of their traditional 
support from the organized private sector, and the beginning of protests from some social 
sectors, particularly the middle class.”198  In addition to the loss of domestic support, the 
Guatemalan military government experienced eroding international support as the 
military’s repressive measures in their fight against the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca (URNG) resulted in human rights abuses that tarnished Guatemala’s image 
abroad, negatively affecting business and military interests.   
In 1982, as the military-led Lucas administration was coming to an end, 
“Guatemala had become so isolated from the international community...that tourism and 
foreign investment revenues had plummeted.”199  Decreased revenue and “rampant 
corruption among some in the military, directly affected the interests of some business 
sectors, which led the industrialists and some sectors of the middle class to question the 
government and to demand a more open political system.”200 Complicating things further 
for the military leaders, concern with human rights abuses led to the discontinuation of 
U.S. military assistance. These circumstances led the military to initiate “a controlled 
process of democratization [beginning with the Cerezo government] in part to burnish 
Guatemala’s image in the United States and the international community.”201  The 
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process was advocated by proponents of the Thesis of National Stability, written by 
General Alejandro Gramajo, that sought “a way to overcome the guerrilla forces on all 
fronts, not just militarily...[and] to guarantee the survival of the armed forces in an 
increasingly hostile environment, where tremendous pressure for demilitarization 
exists.”202  Thus, recognition by both military and civilians “that the costs of continuing 
the war were greater than the possibilities that might be realized through negotiation”203 
led to the eventual peace negotiations. 
B. NEGOTIATING FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH 
At the time of peace negotiations in Guatemala, “the guerrillas had been largely 
defeated as a military force,”204 leaving the military in a strong negotiating position. The 
URNG counted on only “three thousand combatants, of whom only roughly five hundred 
were full-time fighters.”205  Additionally, the army retained considerable influence in 
government.  In light of this influence, the transfer of power from President Cerezo to 
Serrano in 1991 was a substantial accomplishment as Cerezo had “faced substantial 
military encroachment on his authority, including several coup threats.”206  Nevertheless, 
despite their continued political meddling, the military’s support of a controlled transition 
to democracy further strengthened the armed forces’ standing with political elites.  This 
position was reinforced by the army’s actions during the attempted self-coup of President 
Jorge Serrano in May 1993.  Although “portions of the military initially supported 
Serrano...faced with both international and domestic resistance, top army leaders began 
looking for a way out.  When the Constitutional Court called on the high command to 
reverse the coup, they did so.”207   
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The government did achieve a stronger position by the time of negotiations as a 
result of “growing, if tenuous, efforts by civilian authorities to maximize their power vis-
à-vis the armed forces.”208  After the transition to civilian rule in 1986, President Cerezo 
“made some changes in the military commanders, putting in leadership position officers 
whose strategic orientation was based not on the doctrine of national security but on a 
doctrine...[based on] the thesis of national stability.”209  The failed “self-coup” attempt 
by President Jorge Serrano generated intense dialogue “among business leaders, military 
officers, representatives of labor unions, indigenous groups and other civil organizations, 
legislators, and jurists”210 resulting in the selection of Ramiro de León Carpio as interim 
president.  These negotiations generated increased involvement and interest by all sectors 
of society in bringing about the conditions necessary for peace negotiations.  
Nevertheless, this increased influence was not strong enough.  When Alvaro Raze 
assumed the presidency in 1996, his government “lacked the political hegemony to bring 
along elements of the business community, the armed forces, and other conservative 
sectors,”211 weakening his government’s ability to push its reforms during negotiations. 
The URNG was in the worst position of all.  Barely subsisting as a military force, 
the guerrillas “had only modest leverage at the bargaining table [and] this weakness 
contributed to the accord’s lack of specifics.”212  One effect was that “negotiations over 
internal security reforms occupied a relatively small amount of time (about two months), 
while negotiations over a social/economic accord dragged on for more than a year.”213  
The emphasis on socio-economic items reflects the strong position of the Guatemalan 
army to safeguard its prerogatives during the negotiations.  Leaning on their favorable 
position, “the Guatemalan army refused to consider any kind of equivalent of the 
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Salvadoran ad hoc commission that reviewed officers’ records.  It did agree to the 
creation of a ‘commission to clarify the past’...prohibited from naming individuals 
responsible for abuses.”214   
C. CORRUPTION PRESERVED 
The strong negotiating position of the Guatemalan armed forces allowed them to 
effectively protect their interests.  The result was a final agreement that “contained no 
provision for a military purge.”215  Furthermore, the accord “did not provide for any 
vetting of current members of the police, nor did it prevent military officers ‘downsized’ 
from the army from joining the police.”216  This critical omission, and the desire to 
expedite the creation of the new National Civilian Police (PNC), resulted in large 
numbers of the old forces remaining as part of the new security forces, perpetuating 
corrupt and abusive practices.  International monitoring was insufficient because “in early 
1997 the United Nations no longer had the resources available to deploy a 
multifunctional mission of the scale and size proportional to Guatemala that ONUSAL 
was to El Salvador in 1992.”217  Not surprisingly, given these conditions, President Arzú 
“built the ‘new’ institution [PNC] entirely around the existing police leadership, retaining 
almost all the existing personnel and requiring little additional training.”218  As a result, 
most of the old elements and practices were preserved to the detriment of the new police 
force.  
The army’s continued influence also helped to preserve the impunity it enjoyed 
prior to the accords.  Although the peace agreement “specified that members of the 
military charged with common crimes must be tried by civilian courts,”219 the military 
leaders moved quickly to undermine this provision by creating a special office for 
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investigations.  The new entity, “called la oficinita (‘the little office’) and headed by a 
retired military officer.[was intended] to help alleviate the workload of the government’s 
prosecutors.  But in reality, la oficinita monitored and obstructed investigations against 
former military officers.”220  
Not everyone in the old force remained.  In compliance with the accords, “the 
government cashiered more than 40 senior military officers on corruption and narcotics 
charges and reduced the size of the army by a third.”221  Removed from service but not 
jailed, this group continued its illicit activities, becoming “a highly powerful criminal 
cartel.”222  As a Guatemalan official explains, “just like in Russia, where the KGB has 
gotten involved in crime, in Guatemala, it is retired military [officers] who are in control 
of the [drug] trade.”223  In the present situation, “the police must confront former 
colleagues from the security or intelligence services who have now turned to crime.”224  
Sometimes, the old ties serve a nefarious purpose as the well-connected criminals exploit 
their acquaintances to corrupt security personnel and government officials at the highest 
levels.  
The peace transition was not the first time that police reform was initiated.  “Since 
the entry of the first civilian government in 1986 several attempts [were] made to reform 
the Guatemalan police [and] all of these attempts...failed due to the inability to confront 
corruption, military control and intimidation.225  The new reforms were ambitious:  “not 
only was the total number of police men and women almost to be doubled [from 12,000 
to 20,000], but skills, motivation and orientation of the new police force had to be made 
compatible with the principles of democracy and the rule of law.”226  Constitutional 
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constrains on military involvement in internal security, new laws, an institutionalized 
hiring and promotions policy and increased salaries and budget rounded out the proposed 
reforms.227  Unfortunately, faced with rising crime, President Arzú “followed an 
expedient path of folding virtually the entire existing police force into the new PNC, and 
placing the expanded force under the exclusive command of former officers from the old 
police force,”228 in order to speed up the deployment of the new police force.  As a result, 
“the initial PNC higher ranks consisted exclusively of officers from the old police force, 
infamous for their corruption, abuse and incompetence.”229 
The initial recruitment of new members into the PNC encountered many 
problems.  Corruption resulted in some recruits buying their way into the police academy 
as the “recruitment of new police was done through provincial governors, rather than 
through mass media.”230  The process yielded less than ideal recruits as “educational 
standards and screening were kept to a minimum to ensure adequate class sizes.”231  
Even with these low entry standards, former PN members “were allowed two attempts in 
passing the entrance exams [and] many of them still failed.”232  Those former PN 
members that entered the academy underwent a shortened course of 3 months instead of 
6.233  Several “international observers [have] criticized the length of the ‘recycling’ 
course for members of the former police force...[because] the three months of training 
they get is too short to make them more professional and change their attitude.”234  As a 
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result of these issues, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) has stressed the 
need for “a major effort to ensure remedial training/retraining of the police, especially 
recycled police.”235  
Some progress has been made as the education standards for entry into the police 
academy have been raised from a 6th grade to a 9th grade education and “the new police, 
international observers and police instructors at the academy claim that the selection 
procedures are now almost corruption free.”236  The new recruits “receive six hundred 
classes in six months...[covering] Police Techniques, Law, Humanistics, Police 
Administration, Physical Education and Practice and Complementary classes like first aid 
and driving.”237  Guatemalan officers now teach these courses, replacing Spanish 
Guardia Civil instructors,238 but some claim this move has reduced the quality of 
instruction. 
Leadership has also been an issue affecting the professionalism and effectiveness 
of the PNC.  “For many years the directors and sub-directors of the police were army 
officials, [and] sometimes they had two positions at the same time, one in the police and 
one in the army,”239 lacking specialization in police administration.  These were the 
individuals that comprised the initial leadership of the new PNC.  Compounding 
leadership issues, the institution had four different “interior ministers and eight PNC 
chiefs from 2000 through 2003.”240  The leadership problems continue today.  In March 
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four police officers who were implicated in a quadruple homicide...and subsequently 
killed while in custody.”241  This group included the Security Minister, national police 
chief and prison system head. 
Continued military influence and deteriorating internal security conditions 
following the peace accords led President Arzú to follow “an expedient path of folding 
virtually the entire existing police force into the new PNC, and placing the expanded 
force under the exclusive command of former officers from the old police force.”242  Not 
surprisingly, the corruption and ineffectiveness that permeated the previous police force 
continued anew in the PNC.  In essence, the corrupt system that existed prior to the 
accords has been preserved, and “given the many defects of the ‘new’ PNC, long-term 
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V. HOW THE TRANSITIONS EXPLAIN TODAY’S VIOLENCE  
A. DIFFERENT FORCES YIELD DIFFERENT RESULTS 
The ability of the armed forces to influence negotiations and implementation of 
reforms resulted in different internal security forces in Nicaragua, El Salvador and 
Guatemala.  The Sandinistas in Nicaragua were able to protect the prerogatives of the 
armed forces throughout the negotiations and controlled the process of downsizing in a 
manner that retained the more experienced personnel in the force while maintaining 
access to the intelligence and informer networks created in the 1980s.  The Nicaraguan 
police benefited from an increase in personnel, improved training at the police academy 
and the continuation of a community policing approach developed after the revolution.  
In essence, the current police force in Nicaragua benefits from nearly 30 years of 
professional experience, a situation not shared by El Salvador and Guatemala. 
In El Salvador, the army did not exert as much influence and the international 
community prevented excessive manipulation during the implementation of reforms, 
yielding an internal security force that was 75% smaller than the previous force and only 
20% of the new force had previous experience.  The process of reform involved “an 
inherent tension between preserving and taking advantage of the existing knowledge and 
experience of available personnel from the old force, on the one hand, and creating an 
institution that breaks from past practices, on the other.”244  By removing the majority of 
the old personnel, the reforms in El Salvador created an initial security void, but 
improved the likelihood for developing a professional and effective police force.   
In Guatemala, the strong negotiating position of the Guatemalan armed forces 
allowed them to effectively protect their interests and the international community was 
not as involved in the implementation of reforms at it had been in El Salvador.  As a 
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result, the new security forces were virtually unchanged from the old and retained their 
previous inclination towards corrupt and abusive practices.  Not surprisingly, these vastly 
different forces have yielded different levels of success. 
A comparison of success against violence in these countries is challenging.  
Violence is a complex issue, defined by the World Health Organization as the 
“intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another 
person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of 
resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation.”245  
Reliable information is difficult to obtain as different organizations have different 
approaches for collecting, ratifying and measuring data on violence.  It is not unusual for 
government figures to differ from those provided by international organizations, NGOs 
and other interest groups.  At times, even government figures reflect inconsistencies 
depending on the agency providing the information.  Finding an effective indicator is thus 
complicated.   
Under reporting of crime is also a factor and it is estimated that only 15-30% of 
violent crimes in the region are reported to the authorities.246  The data is often difficult 
to obtain.  During the April 2008 Anti-gang Convention in El Salvador, for example, only 
four Central American countries provided the requested information for analysis: 
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Panama,247 thus Nicaragua did not provide any 
information.  One solution is to concentrate on homicide rates because “international 
homicide figures are generally considered the most reliable indicator of the violent crime 
situation in a country, since, unlike crimes like robbery and assault, most intentional 
homicides come to the attention of the police.”248  By concentrating on homicide rates,  
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the effects of underreporting and inefficient data collection are minimized.  An analysis 
of homicide rates in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala shows significant differences 














Figure 1.   Homicides Per 1000,000 Citizens249 
 
As the chart indicates, Nicaragua exhibits a much lower homicide rate than El 
Salvador and Guatemala.  The present numbers for Nicaragua are lower than those in the 
first three years following the transition.  The numbers for El Salvador and Guatemala are 
also lower than those in the three years immediately following their peace accords, but 
the incidence of homicides is much higher than Nicaragua:  almost 4 times as much for 
Guatemala and five times higher in El Salvador.  One probable explanation for the 
difference may be the relative size of the countries’ police forces.  Figure 2 provides a 
comparison between the three police forces. 
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Figure 2.   Police Per 100,000 Citizens250 
 
The chart reveals that despite having a low number of police personnel per 
100,000 citizens, Nicaragua has the lowest incidence of homicides of the three countries.  
Guatemala counts with a similar number of police as Nicaragua, but it has four times the 
homicide rate.  In El Salvador, the difference is even greater.  Although El Salvador 
counts with twice as many policemen than Guatemala and 1.21 more per 100,000 citizens 
than Nicaragua, it has the highest homicide rate, five times higher than the rate for 
Nicaragua.  It should be noted that all three countries suffer from a high deficiency in 
numbers of police.  Previous studies on establishing the rule of law after conflict suggest 
that “after five years, the level of domestic police should be at least 200 police per 
100,000 inhabitants.”251  In the year 2000, UNODC figures showed the U.S. had 244 
police per 100,000.252   Figure 3 shows a similar disparity when comparing territorial 
coverage measured in number of police per square kilometer in each country.  Nicaragua  
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has the lowest number, with 0.08 policemen per square kilometer.  Guatemala’s coverage 
reaches 0.19 police per square kilometer and El Salvador counts with the highest level at 
1.0 police per square kilometer.   
 
 
Figure 3.   Police Per Square Kilometer253 
Nicaragua’s success at controlling homicide rates despite a much smaller police 
force than El Salvador and similar numbers of police to those in Guatemala highlights the 
effectiveness of a police force that has operated for nearly 30 years.  Another important 
performance indicator is the rate of case clearance for reported homicides, defined as “the 
share of recorded crimes that results in a suspect being identified.”254  Figure 4 compares 
the latest homicide clearance rates compiled by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime for all three countries. 
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Figure 4.   Homicide Clearance Rates  
The clearance rate is "a key performance indicator for both uniformed personnel 
and investigating officers, as both parties play a key role in gathering information and 
witnesses, and apprehending suspects.”255  It also provides an indicator of the 
competency of these officers and their ability to follow proper procedure since 
“acceptance of the case by prosecutors and judicial authorities indicates that the police 
have built a sound case.”256  The high clearance rate for Nicaragua is almost equal to 
Costa Rica’s rate of 82 percent and shows a capable and professional force that follows 
proper procedures to build a solid case.   
El Salvador’s homicide case clearance rate of 44 percent is more than six times 
better than Guatemala’s 7 percent.  The better performance by El Salvador’s police forces 
compared to Guatemala reflects the growing effects of improved training and 
development of a new professional ethos stemming from the removal of the majority of 
the previous force.  Guatemala’s performance reflects the continuation of old practices 
because, “unlike El Salvador, Guatemala’s police never underwent a comprehensive 
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reform process, and this is reflected in their reputation and performance.”257  Nicaragua’s 
clearance rate indicates an internal security force that retained a core of effective and 
experienced personnel following the transition.  The higher clearance rate increases crime 
prevention by generating a strong deterrent effect, since most criminals are counting on 
the likelihood that they will not get caught.  By effectively bringing criminals to justice, 
the Nicaraguan police—and an improving Salvadoran Police--increase the odds against 
criminals, helping to prevent nefarious activities. 
Corruption is another factor that undermines the effectiveness of the police.  As 
the individual analysis of each country indicated, Guatemala is the country that retained 
the most corruption in its internal security forces.  Corruption continues to be the main 
security challenge in Guatemala, affecting the country’s ability to effectively deal with 
violence, gangs, and organized crime.  President Colom has vowed to cleanse the 
government and security forces of corruption, but “some institutions are so deeply 
compromised that effective state law enforcement is an objective likely to take years 
rather than months to achieve.”258  The extent of the problem is such that “in the six 
months prior to [October 2007] a total of 2,244 agents were...fired for being implicated in 
different illegal acts including abuse of authority, drug trafficking, kidnapping and 
extrajudicial execution.”259     
El Salvador’s reforms following the transition should generate a smaller 
corruption problem than Guatemala, while Nicaragua should reflect lower levels of 
corruption as well.  The 2008 Latinobarometro report supports this assumption.  When 
asked what percentage of public officials are corrupt, Guatemalans answered 76.2%, El 
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Salvadorans replied 72.3% and Nicaraguans estimated 68.9% to be corrupt.260  Asked 
about progress in the fight against corruption, El Salvador had the best assessment, with 
48% of respondents seeing progress in this area while in Nicaragua the figure was 45%.  
Guatemala’s citizens reported the lowest rates of the three countries as only 26% of 
Guatemalans believed progress has been made in fighting corruption.261   
One measure of the level of corruption in the police forces is public perception of 
the possibility of successfully bribing a policeman.  In Guatemala, 47% of citizens 
believe it is possible to bribe the police.  In Nicaragua, 34% believe they can bribe a cop 
while in El Salvador, only 24% believe this is possible.262  Consistent with the analysis of 
the transitions, Guatemalans perceive their police forces to be the most corrupt of the 
three. 
B. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO FIGHTING VIOLENCE 
The response to violence in El Salvador and Guatemala has emphasized 
suppression through mano dura policies.  Nicaragua, on the other hand, has opted for 
prevention programs centered around a community policing approach, perpetuating the 
methods utilized by the former Sandinista Police that comprise most of the present force.  
Most studies agree that community based approaches work best to prevent violence and 
gang activity.  Gangs are territorial and concerned about protecting their turf, so the best 
approaches enlist the help of neighbors in the areas where gangs operate.  The recent 
study by Demoscopia indicates a high level of willingness on the part of neighbors and 
family members of gang members to participate in prevention and reinsertion 
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programs,263 making this an attractive approach.  The success in Nicaragua is gaining 
notice from other countries and both El Salvador and Guatemala have begun to introduce 
community policing approaches in their fight against violence and gangs.   
The move towards integration of community policing approaches by El Salvador 
and Guatemala is an attempt to apply lessons learned from Nicaragua and other countries 
in the region that have been more successful in the fight against gangs and violence.  In 
the case of Nicaragua, the community policing approach is a continuation of the 
strategies utilized prior to the transition in which the Sandinista Defense Committees 
(CDS) acted both as a neighborhood watch organization and a network of informers that, 
along with other mass organizations, provided vast amounts of information to the security 
forces.  Nicaragua’s methods have been in effect for close to 30 years, as they were 
implemented soon after the Sandinista victory in 1979 and have benefited from access to 
mass organizations that act as informer networks. As the transition process allowed the 
Sandinistas to retain the more experienced core of their personnel in the new security 
forces, these veterans continued utilizing the same approach.  Thus, the choice of a 
community policing approach in Nicaragua is a direct result of the transitions process 
itself.  Implementation of this approach in El Salvador and Guatemala will take time 
before it manifests similar results. 
As the data has shown, the characteristics of the police forces in Nicaragua, El 
Salvador and Guatemala reflect consequences from the transition processes in each 
country.  In Nicaragua, an experienced and professional core, with continued access to a 
vast network of informants in neighborhood and mass organizations allowed for the 
formation of an effective police force capable of high rates of homicide case clearance 
rates and the implementation of a successful community policing approach.  In 
Guatemala, the influence of the military helped retain most of the previously corrupt and 
ineffective personnel, resulting in an emphasis on repressive measures and alarmingly 
low homicide clearance rates.  El Salvador, on the other hand, underwent substantial 
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reforms that resulted in a substantially reduced internal security force of which only 20% 
had previous experience, yielding a force that is still in transition but has great potential 
to develop into a more professional and effective institution.  Thus, the present character 
of the police forces in each of these countries has been affected by the transition process, 
which helps explain the different levels of effectiveness and professionalism as well as 



















This thesis has shown that the militaries in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala 
exerted different levels of influence in the period prior to, during, and after the 
transitions, affecting the implementation of reforms and shaping the new police forces.  
The extent to which the militaries were able to influence negotiations, prevent leadership 
purges and control the process of reducing personnel, determined whether or not old 
methods and previous institutional ethos were preserved.  Thus, the army played an 
important role in shaping the police forces in these countries today.  The effects of army 
influence manifest themselves in the present effectiveness and professionalism of these 
institutions and their level of corruption, with important consequences for the future. 
In the case of Nicaragua, the Sandinistas were able to greatly influence the 
process through their control of security forces and mass organizations, legislative 
maneuvers prior to the turnover to the new government, and effective bargaining of the 
transition protocol.  The net result was continued Sandinista dominance of security forces 
and the preservation of previous institutions and their leadership, along with their 
experience.  As a result, the fight against violence and gangs in Nicaragua has benefited 
from the preservation of a capable and well-trained core of security personnel, access to 
mass organizations and their information networks, the continuation of a successful 
community policing approach, improved training and an increase of forces that have 
perpetuated the professionalism and effectiveness of the force.  These traits manifest 
themselves in low levels of crime and gang presence, and a high percentage of homicide 
case clearance rates.  
The Guatemalan military was very influential during the negotiations, and 
transition, allowing them to retain most of the old personnel, transfer former security 
personnel into the new police force, and obstruct investigations and purges of former 
military.  In effect, the PNC became an old institution with a new name.  Unfortunately, 
this meant that the corruption, ineffectiveness and crude methods of the old security 
forces hampered the development of a new institutional identity.   Thus, the high level of 
army influence in the process has negatively affected the professionalism and 
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effectiveness of the Guatemalan PNC, a fact reflected in today’s high crime rates, the 
public’s perception of the PNC as corrupt, extremely low homicide case clearance rates 
and continued involvement of police personnel in criminal activity.  The situation is such 
that it may require a massive purge of the current force with stringent vetting procedures 
for future members similar to the current Mexican efforts to create a new federal law 
enforcement force as part of the Merida Initiative.   
El Salvador underwent the most radical reforms of the three countries.  Although 
the government reacted to the post-transition surge in crime by delaying the disbanding 
of old security forces, international organizations exerted enough pressure and 
maintained sufficient in-country presence to minimize the negative effects of these 
actions.  Additionally, the international community provided timely funds to ensure the 
new ANSP could begin to train new recruits and overcome the equipment deficiencies it 
faced as the new force deployed.  The nearly seventy-five per cent reduction in internal 
security forces, coupled with the loss of eighty-percent of experienced personnel created 
a vast security void, generating a surge in crime.    
The PNC in El Salvador shows great promise for increased success in the future 
as the removal of the old personnel increases the chances to develop an institutional ethos 
compatible with democratic policing methods, generating a more professional and 
effective force.  Furthermore, El Salvador is rapidly assuming the leadership of regional 
anti-gang and anti-violence efforts, and continues to work with the FBI, DEA, 
INTERPOL, and other international agencies, to combat gangs and narco-trafficking.  
This commitment to cooperation and a regional approach increase the opportunities for 
success in the future.  
The issue of violence and gangs is complex and multi-dimensional.  The debate 
points to many socio-economic causes for violence and gang membership that require 
diverse methods for suppression, prevention and reintegration.  These methods all share 
one thing:  they require professional, capable and effective police forces to be successful.  
Therefore, improving the police force is the most important element of any anti-crime 
effort.  Through a greater understanding of the benefits and shortcomings resulting from 
the implementation of reforms following the transitions to democracy in Nicaragua, El 
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Salvador and Guatemala, governments can better correct deficiencies and duplicate 
success.  As this thesis shows, the lessons learned in these countries can provide a useful 
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